Abstract. The paper treats 4 different fragments of first-order logic induced by their respective versions of Kripke style semantics for modal intuitionistic logic. In order to capture these fragments, the notion of asimulation, defined in [7] , is modified and extended to yield Van Benthem type of semantic characterization of their respective expressive powers. It is shown further, that this characterization can be easily carried over to arbitrary first-order definable subclasses of classical first-order models.
It was shown in [7] and [8] that both intuitionistic first-order logic and its propositional fragment, viewed as a different fragments of classical first-order logic, admit of a full analogue of modal characterization theorem 1 where invariance with respect to bisimulations is replaced with invariance with respect to (first-order) asimulations respectively. The present paper extends these results onto the main versions of basic modal intuitionistic logic.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 1 starts with notational conventions, after which we introduce the main variants of Kripke style semantics for the basic modal intuitionistic system. All in all we consider 4 different variants of semantics, of which 2 are easily discharged by the versions of clauses employed in [7] and [8] for basic intutionistic logic. However, for the other 2 systems their semantical characterization is less obvious, mainly due to their treatment of diamond modality.
Section 2 then starts with the main task of the present paper. It contains definitions for all the four variants of extension of basic asimulation notion to be employed in semantic characterization of their respective variants of basic modal intuitionistic logic. We also formulate here the main results of the paper, although their proofs are postponed till Sections 3 and 4. Then Section 5 is devoted to characterization of modal intuitionistic fragments of FOL modulo first-order definable classes of models. Section 6 gives conclusions and drafts directions for future work.
Preliminaries 1.Notation
A formula is a formula of classical predicate logic without identity whose predicate letters are in vocabulary Σ = { R 2 , R 2 ✷ , R 2 ✸ , P 1 1 , . . . P 1 n , . . . }. We assume { ⊥, →, ∨, ∧, ∀, ∃ } as the set of basic connectives and quantifiers for this variant of classical first-order language, which we call correspondence language. A model is a classical first-order model of correspondence language. We refer to correspondence formulas with lower-case Greek letters ϕ, ψ, and χ, and to sets of correspondence formulas with upper-case Greek letters Γ and ∆. If ϕ is a correspondence formula, then we associate with it the following finite vocabulary Σ ϕ ⊆ Σ such that Σ ϕ = { R 2 , R 2 ✷ , R 2 ✸ } ∪ { P i | P i occurs in ϕ }. More generally, we refer with Θ to an arbitrary subset of Σ such that R ∈ Θ. If ψ is a formula and every predicate letter occurring in ψ is in Θ, then we call ψ a Θ-formula.
We refer to sequence x 1 , . . . , x n of any objects asx n . We identify a sequence consisting of a single element with this element. If all free variables of a formula ϕ (formulas in Γ) coincide with a variable x, we write ϕ(x) (Γ(x)).
By degree of a classical first-order formula we mean the greatest number of nested quantifiers occurring in it. Degree of a formula ϕ is denoted by r(ϕ). Its formal definition by induction on the complexity of ϕ goes as follows:
r(⊥) = r(ϕ) = 0 for atomic ϕ r(ϕ • ψ) = max(r(ϕ), r(ψ)) for • ∈ { ∧, ∨, → } r(Qxϕ) = r(ϕ) + 1 for Q ∈ { ∀, ∃ }
For k ∈ N, we say that Θ-formula ϕ(x) such that r(ϕ) ≤ k is a (Θ, x, k)-formula. For a binary relation S and any objects s, t we abbreviate the fact that s S t ∧ t S s by s ↔ S t. We use the following notation for models of classical predicate logic:
where the first element of a model is its domain and the second element is its interpretation of predicate letters. If k ∈ N then we write R k (R ✷k , R ✸k ) as an abbreviation for ι k (R) (ι k (R ✷ ) , ι k (R ✸ )). If a ∈ U then we say that (M, a) is a pointed model. Further, we say that ϕ(x) is true at (M, a) and write M, a |= ϕ(x) iff for any variable assignment α in M such that α(x) = a we have M, α |= ϕ(x). It follows from this convention that the truth of a formula ϕ(x) at a pointed model is to some extent independent from the choice of its only free variable. Moreover, for k ∈ N we will sometimes write a |= k ϕ(x) instead of M k , a |= ϕ(x). A modal intuitionistic formula is a formula of modal intuitionistic propositional logic, where { ⊥, →, ∨, ∧, ✷, ✸ } is the set of basic connectives and modal operators, and { p n | n ∈ N } is the set of propositional letters. We refer to intuitionistic formulas with letters I, J, K, possibly with primes or subscripts.
Definitions of basic modal intuitionistic logic
There exist different versions of basic system of modal intuitionistic logic. In these paper we only consider versions that have a Kripke-style semantics associated with them, and we will view these versions via the lens of their respective Kripke-style semantics.
Quite naturally, Kripke-style semantics for a given version of intuitionistic modal logic is normally built as an extension of Kripke semantics for basic intuitionistic propositional logic; that is to say, the models extend Kripke models for basic propositional logic and the satisfaction clauses for ⊥, →, ∨, ∧ are left unchanged (cf. [6, Definition 7.1 and Definition 7.2])
The new components in the models are one or more additional binary relations between states which are needed to handle the satisfaction clauses for ✷ and ✸. In the most general case both modal operators are handled by separate relations R ✷ and R ✸ , although not infrequently one assumes that R ✷ and R ✸ do coincide 2 or are otherwise non-trivially related. It is also quite common to assume different conditions connecting R ✷ and R ✸ with accessibility relation R, like, e. g. assuming that
Both the condition that R ✷ = R ✸ and the other conditions mentioned in this connection in the existing literature are easily first-order definable. Since it was shown in [7] and [8] that asimulations are easily scalable according to arbitrary first-order conditions imposed upon the models, we will first concentrate on the minimal case without any restrictions imposed and then accommodate for the possible restrictions in a trivial way, by restricting the domain and the counter-domain of asimulation relations accordingly.
As for the satisfaction clauses, employed in the existing literature on Kripke-style semantics for intuitionistic modal operators, the following variants of them seem to be the most common and general:
This gives us 4 possible choices of satisfaction clauses. In literature, these sets of satisfaction clauses are often viewed as more or less explicit manifestations of one and the same set of semantic intuitions. In this view, the reason why clauses (✷ 2 ) and (✸ 2 ) differ from (✷ 1 ) and (✸ 1 ), respectively, is that the former clauses lift up to the level of semantical definitions some desirable properties that under (✷ 1 ) and (✸ 1 ) are handled by restrictions on the class of models. 4 However, in what follows, we will disregard this circumstance and will simply consider these four systems of clauses as bona fide different systems. The reason for this is that, like we said above, we find it convenient in the context of treating modal intuitionistic formulas via asimulations, to omit whatever restrictions on models that are employed to equate these systems in the existing literature on the subject.
Every of the 4 semantical choices sketched above induces a different standard translation of modal intuitionistic formulas into classical FOL thus giving a different frag-ment of it. 5 More precisely, for i, j ∈ {1, 2} we will denote the (i, j)-standard translation, or the standard translation induced by adopting (✷ i )-clause together with (✸ j )-clause above, by ST ij .
Thus the inductive definitions of the (i, j)-standard x-translations run as follows:
Standard conditions are imposed on the variables x, y, and z.
Characterization of modal intuitionistic formulas: definitions and main results
Our aim in the present paper is to characterize the expressive power of the four fragments of correspondence language induced by the four above-mentioned versions of (i, j)-standard translation of modal intuitionistic formulas via the suitable extension of the notion of asimulation for the intuitionistic propositional logic. We will begin by giving strict definitions of the four required extensions, and then formulate the two versions of our main result for all the four considered fragments of correspondence language in one full sweep. It is easy to see that if one chooses (✸ 1 ) as a definition for the semantics of possibility, then the respective standard translation of modal propositional formulas looks almost as a notational variant of intuitionistic first-order logic. The semantics of diamond then resembles the semantics of intuitionistic existential quantifier, and the semantics of box, if interpreted according to (✷ 2 ), resembles the semantics of intuitionistic universal quantifier. The only difference is that the binary relation of existence of object in a state is replaced by binary relations R ✷ and R ✸ respectively. Also, note that now these 'quantifiers' are based on different binary relations rather than one and the same, but the proofs given in the following section show that this little wrinkle is of no consequence:
, any unary predicate letter P ∈ Θ, the following conditions hold:
, any unary predicate letter P ∈ Θ the following conditions hold:
The situation changes very little when one adapts (✷ 1 ) instead of (✷ 2 ) as the clause defining box. In fact, this clause is the standard one from classical modal logic, and to accommodate for this change one only needs to pick a suitable asymmentric variant of the bisimulation clause. The resulting definitions then look as follows:
any unary predicate letter P ∈ Θ, the conditions (p-type), (elem), (p-base), (p-step), (p-diam-1) are satisfied together with the following condition:
, any unary predicate letter P ∈ Θ the conditions (elem), (type), (base), (step), (diam-1) are satisfied together with the following condition:
If, instead of using clause (✸ 1 ), one chooses clause (✸ 2 ), things get somewhat more complicated. In order get the right extensions of the basic asimulation notion, one has to re-define asimulations as relation pairs rather than single binary relations. As our first case we consider the set of correspondence formulas induced by (2, 2)-standard translations of modal intuitionistic formulas:
∈ U j any unary predicate letter P ∈ Θ, the conditions (p-type), (elem), (p-base), (p-step), (p-box-2) are satisfied together with the following conditions:
, any unary predicate letter P ∈ Θ the conditions (elem), (type), (base), (step), (box-2) are satisfied together with the following conditions:
The only case left is the one where one defines the satisfaction relation by using (✸ 2 ) combined with (✷ 1 ). The respective definitions simply re-shuffle the conditions mentioned in the previous versions:
, any unary predicate letter P ∈ Θ the conditions (elem), (B-type), (type), (base), (step), (box-1), (diam-2(1)) and (diam-2(2)) are satisfied.
Before we reach the formulation of our main results, we still need one more technical notion, that of invariance with respect to a class of relations: Definition 9. Let α be a class of relations such that for any A ∈ α there is a Θ and there are Θ-models M 1 and M 2 such that (p-type) holds. Then a formula ϕ(x) is said to be invariant with respect to α, iff for any A ∈ α for any corresponding Θ-models M 1 and M 2 , and for any a ∈ U 1 and b ∈ U 2 it is true that:
Of course, our primary examples of α will be the classes of all (i, j)-modal kasimulations for a given natural k and the classes of all (i, j)-modal asimulations. In case j = 2 we identify the invariance with respect to (A, B) with invariance with respect to its left projection A.
It turns out that the properties of invariance with respect to these relation classes can be used to characterize modal intuitionistic fragment of FOL described by their respective ST ij . More precisely, one can obtain the following theorems: Theorem 1. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}. A formula ϕ(x) is equivalent to an (i, j)-standard xtranslation of a modal intuitionistic formula iff there exists a k ∈ N such that ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to (i, j)-modal k-asimulations.
In what follows, we will also need to speak of basic asimulations. Using the notation of Definitions 1 and 2, a basic (
is a binary relation satisfying all the conditions of Definition 1 (resp. Definition 2) but the last two.
3 Characterization of modal intuitionistic formulas: the main case Theorems 1 and 2 admit of four different instantiations of of i and j. The most difficult ones seem to be the two instantiations with j = 2 since with them the situation bears the least degree of analogy to the first-order intuitionistic logic. Therefore, in the present section consider in some detail the case i = j = 2, whereas in the next one we show how to adapt our proofs to the other cases. In formulating our lemmas and presenting our proofs we will mimic the structure of the proofs given in [7] and [8] and will sometimes refer the reader to their respective parts in cases concerning basic asimulations and their properties.
Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 1 (Key Lemma 1). Let ϕ(x) = ST 22 (I, x) for some modal intuitionistic formula I, and let
Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of I. In what follows we will abbreviate the induction hypothesis by IH.
First we note, that since (A, B) is a (2, 2)-modal (M 1 , t), (M 2 , u) l -asimulation, then A is a basic (M 1 , t), (M 2 , u) l -asimulation, which means that we can re-use Lemma 1 of [7] in order to handle the basis and the induction steps for ⊥, ∧, ∨, and →. There remain the two cases which involve the modal operators:
Assume that:
Moreover, it follows from definition of r that: (3) and (4) clearly imply that m + 1 < l, it follows from (2) and (p-box-2) that one can choose c, e ∈ U i , such that:
So, we reason as follows: (1), (6), and (7)) (3) and (5)) (10) (8), (9), (10) by IH)
Since d was chosen to be an arbitrary R j -successor of b, and f an arbitrary R ✷j -successor of d, this means that
and we are done. Case 2. Let I = ✸J. Then
Moreover, it follows from definition of r that:
Since (14) and (15) clearly imply that m + 1 < l, it follows from (13) and (p-diam-2(1)) that one can choose a c ∈ U i , such that:
Now from (12) and (17) it follows that we can choose an e ∈ U i such that
Also, by (18), condition (p-diam-2 (2)), and the fact that m + 1 < l, we have:
We further get that: (14) and (16) (20), (21), and (22)) (
Since d was chosen to be an arbitrary R j -successor of b, this means that
and we are done.
We use Lemma 1 to derive the 'easy' direction of (2, 2)-instantiation of Theorem 1:
is equivalent to a (2, 2)-standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula, then there exists k ∈ N such that ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal k-asimulations.
Proof. Let ϕ(x) be logically equivalent to ST 22 (I, x) for some intuitionistic formula I, and let r(ST 22 (I, x)) = k. Then it follows from Lemma 1 (setting i := 1, j := 2, m := 0, and l := k) that ST 22 (I, x) is invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal k-asimulations, and so is ϕ(x).
On our way to the inverse direction of (2, 2)-instantiation of Theorem 1 we first need a new piece of notation. For a formula ϕ(x) in the correspondence language, variable x and a natural l, we denote with int(ϕ, x, l) the set of all (2, 2)-standard x-translations of intuitionistic formulas, which happen to be (Σ ϕ , x, l)-formulas. We use this notation to define three types of formulas which are important components in the proofs to follow. Let Σ ϕ ⊆ Θ, let M be a Θ-model and let a ∈ U . Then:
and, further:
We mention the following obvious link between different pieces of notation just defined. Under the above-mentioned assumptions about ϕ(x), l, Θ, M , a, and for any M be a Θ-model M ′ and a ′ ∈ U ′ we have:
We then invoke the following well known-fact about classical first-order logic:
Lemma 2. For any finite predicate vocabulary Θ, any variable x and any natural k there are, up to logical equivalence, only finitely many (Θ, x, k)-formulas.
This fact is proved as Lemma 3.4 in [5, pp. 189-190] . It implies that for every set of formulas, which have one of the forms int(ϕ, x, l), tp l (ϕ(x), M, a), tp l (ϕ(x), M, a), imp l (ϕ(x), M, a) there exist a finite subset collecting the logical equivalents for all the formulas in the set. Moreover, it allows us to collect logical equivalents of all (2, 2)-standard translations of intuitionistic formulas which are true together with a given formula at some pointed model in a single formula which we will call a complete conjunction:
The two following lemmas summarize some rather obvious properties of complete conjunctions:
Proof. Consider tp k (ϕ(x), M, a). This set is non-empty since ST 22 (⊥ → ⊥, x) will be true at (M, a). Due to Lemma 2, we can choose in this set a non-empty finite subset Γ(x) such that any formula from tp k (ϕ(x), M, a) is logically equivalent to (and hence follows from) a formula in Γ(x). By Γ(x) ⊆ tp k (ϕ(x), M, a), we also have M, a |= Γ(x), therefore, Γ(x) is a complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunction.
Lemma 4. For any formula ϕ(x) and any natural k there are, up to logical equivalence, only finitely many complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunctions.
Proof. It suffices to observe that for any formula ϕ(x) and any natural k, a complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunction is a (Σ ϕ , x, k)-formula. Our lemma then follows from Lemma 2.
As a result, we are now able to establish the 'hard' right-to-left direction of Theorem 1:
Lemma 5 (Key Lemma 2). Let k = r(ϕ(x)) and let ϕ(x) be invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal k-asimulations. Then ϕ(x) is equivalent to a (2, 2)-standard x-translation of a modal intuitionistic formula.
Proof. We may assume that both ϕ(x) and ¬ϕ(x) are satisfiable, since both ⊥ and ⊤ are obviously invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal k-asimulations and we have, for example, the following valid formulas:
We may also assume that there are two complete (ϕ,
, and both formulas Ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x) and Ψ ′ (x) ∧ ¬ϕ(x) are satisfiable.
For suppose otherwise. Then take the set of all complete (ϕ, x, k + 2)-conjunctions Ψ(x) such that the formula Ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x) is satisfiable. This set is non-empty, because ϕ(x) is satisfiable, and by Lemma 3, it can be satisfied only together with some complete (ϕ, x, k + 2)-conjunction. Now, using Lemma 4, choose in it a finite nonempty subset { Ψ i1 (x) . . . , Ψ in (x) } such that any complete (ϕ, x, k + 2)-conjunction is equivalent to an element of this subset. We can show that ϕ(x) is logically equivalent to Ψ i1 (x) ∨ . . . ∨ Ψ in (x). In fact, if M, a |= ϕ(x) then, by Lemma 3, at least one complete (ϕ, x, k + 2)-conjunction is true at (M, a) and therefore, its equivalent in { Ψ i1 (x) . . . , Ψ in (x) } is also true at (M, a), and so, finally we have
and by the choice of Ψ ij (x) the formula Ψ ij (x) ∧ ϕ(x) is satisfiable, so, by our assumption, the formula Ψ ij (x) ∧ ¬ϕ(x) must be unsatisfiable, and hence ϕ(x) must follow from Ψ ij (x). But in this case we will have M, a |= ϕ(x) as well. So ϕ(x) is logically equivalent to Ψ i1 (x) ∨ . . . , ∨Ψ in (x) but the latter formula, being a disjunction of conjunctions of (2, 2)-standard x-translations of modal intuitionistic formulas, is itself a (2, 2)-standard x-translation of a modal intuitionistic formula, and so we are done.
If, on the other hand, one can take two complete (ϕ,
, and formulas Ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x) and Ψ ′ (x) ∧ ¬ϕ(x) are satisfiable, we reason as follows. Take a pointed Σ ϕ -model (M 1 , t) such that t |= 1 Ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x), and that any formula ψ(x) ∈ tp k+2 (ϕ(x), M 1 , t) follows from Ψ(x), and take any pointed
We can construct an (2, 2)-modal (M 1 , t), (M 2 , u) k -asimulation and thus obtain a contradiction in the following way. We define it as the ordered couple (A, B), where for arbitrary i, j ∈ { 1, 2 } and (
we set:
and, for B:
With these definitions, we can show that A is a basic (M 1 , t), (M 2 , u) k -asimulation, arguing as in Theorem 1 of [7] . Therefore, in order to show that (A, B) is a (2, 2)-modal (M 1 , t), (M 2 , u) k -asimulation, we only need to verify conditions (p-B-type), (p-box-2), (p-diam-2(1)), and (p-diam-2(2)). It is clear that B satisfies (p-B-type).
To verify condition (p-box-2), take any (ā m , a) A (b m , b) such that m + 1 < k and any d, f ∈ U j such that b R j d and d R ✷j f . In this case we will also have m + 2 ≤ k. Then consider tp k−m (ϕ(x), M j , f ). This set is non-empty, since by our assumption we have k − m ≥ 0. Therefore, as we have r(ST 22 (⊥, x)) = 0, we will also have ST 22 (⊥, x) ∈ tp k−m (ϕ(x), M j , f ). Then, according to our Lemma 2, there exists a finite non-empty set of logical equivalents for tp k−m (ϕ(x), M j , f ). Choosing this finite set, we in fact choose some finite
But then we obtain that
In fact, d, f jointly falsify this boxed disjunction for (M j , b). But, given that
the standard translation of boxed disjunction under consideration must be in
and therefore this boxed disjunction must be false at (M i , a) as well. But then take any c, e ∈ U i such that a R i c, c R ✷i e and c, e falsify the boxed disjunction under consideration. By choice of { ST (J 1 , x) . . . ST (J q , x) } it follows that
and thus (x), M j , d ). This set is non-empty, since by our assumption we have k − m ≥ 0. Therefore, as we have r(ST 22 (⊥, x)) = 0, we will also have
Then, according to our Lemma 2, there exists a finite non-empty set of logical equivalents for imp k−m (ϕ(x), M j , d). Choosing this finite set, we in fact choose some finite
In fact, d falsify this disjunction for (M j , b). But, given that
the standard translation of the modalized disjunction under consideration must be in
and therefore the modalized disjunction must be false at (M i , a) as well. But then take any c ∈ U i such that a R i c, and for every e, such that c R ✸i e, we have 
This set is non-empty, since by our assumption we have k − m ≥ 1. Therefore, as we have r(ST 22 (⊥ → ⊥, x)) = 1, we will also have ST 22 (⊥ → ⊥, x) ∈ tp k−m+1 (ϕ(x), M i , c). Then, according to our Lemma 2, there exists a finite non-empty set of logical equivalents for tp k−m+1 (ϕ(x), M i , c). Choosing this finite set, we in fact choose some finite { ST 22 (I 1 , x) 
Note, further, that by (ā m , a) B (b m , b) we have
thus:
But then take any d ∈ U j such that b R ✸j d and we have
By choice of { ST 22 (I 1 , x) . . . ST 22 (I p , x) } it follows that We can now finish the proof of (2, 2)-instantiation of Theorem 1:
Proof. The 'only if' direction we have by Corollary 1. In the other direction, let ϕ(x) be invariant with respect to k-asimulations for some k. If k ≤ r(ϕ), then every (2, 2)-modal r(ϕ)-asimulation is a (2, 2)-modal k-asimulation, so ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal r(ϕ)-asimulations and hence, by Lemma 5, ϕ(x) is equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula. If, on the other hand, r(ϕ) < k, then set l := k − r(ϕ) and consider variablesȳ l not occurring in ϕ(x). Then r(∀ȳ l ϕ(x)) = k and ϕ(x) is logically equivalent to ∀ȳ l ϕ(x), so the latter formula is also invariant with respect to k-asimulations, and hence by Theorem 5 ∀ȳ l ϕ(x) is logically equivalent to a standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula. But then ϕ(x) is equivalent to this standard x-translation as well.
Proof of Theorem 2
We now turn to the proof of (2, 2)-instantiation of Theorem 2. The 'only if' direction we again have by Corollary 1: equivalent to a (2, 2) -standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula, then ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal asimulations.
Proof. Let ϕ(x) be logically equivalent to ST 22 (I, x) for some intuitionistic formula I. For an arbitrary Θ ⊇ Σ ϕ , Θ-models M 1 and M 2 , and arbitrary t ∈ U 1 , u ∈ U 2 let (A, B) be a (2, 2)-modal (M 1 , t), (M 2 , u) -asimulation, so that we have t A u. Assume that t |= 1 ϕ(x).
Then consider the ordered couple (A ′ , B ′ ) such that:
It is straightforward to verify that (A ′ , B ′ ) is a (2, 2)-modal (M 1 , t), (M 2 , u) k -asimulation for every k ∈ N. Moreover, we still have t A ′ u. By Corollary 1, there is a natural k, such that ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal k-asimulation, therefore we have u |= 2 ϕ(x).
Since the (2, 2)-modal (M 1 , t), (M 2 , u) -asimulation (A, B) was chosen arbitrarily, this means that ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal asimulations.
To proceed, we need to introduce some further notions and results from classical model theory. For a model M andā n ∈ U let [M,ā n ] be the extension of M withā n as new individual constants interpreted as themselves. It is easy to see that there is a simple relation between the truth of a formula at a sequence of elements of a Θ-model and the truth of its substitution instance in an extension of the above-mentioned kind; namely, for any Θ-model M , any Θ-formula ϕ(ȳ n ,w m ) and anyā n ,b m ∈ U it is true that:
We will call a theory of M (and write T h(M )) the set of all first-order sentences true at M . We will call an n-type of M a set of formulas Γ(w n ) consistent with T h(M ).
Definition 11. Let M be a Θ-model. M is ω-saturated iff for all k ∈ N and for all a n ∈ U , every k-type
Definition of ω-saturation normally requires satisfiability of 1-types only. However, our modification is equivalent to the more familiar version: see e.g. [4, Lemma 4.31, p. 73].
It is known that every model can be elementarily extended to an ω-saturated model; in other words, the following lemma holds: Lemma 6. Let M be a Θ-model. Then there is an ω-saturated extension M ′ of M such that for allā n ∈ U and every Θ-formula ϕ(w n ):
The latter lemma is a trivial corollary of e.g. [3, Lemma 5.1.14, p. 216].
A very useful property of ω-saturated models is that one can define among them (2, 2)-modal asimulations more or less according to the strategy assumed in the proof of Lemma 5. In order to do this, however, we need to re-define the types used in the above proof. We collect the required changes in the following definition:
Definition 12. Let M be a Θ-model, t ∈ U and let x be a variable in correspondence language. Then we define int x (Θ) to be the set of all Θ-formulas that are (2, 2)-standard x-translations of modal intuitionistic formulas. We further set:
The analogue of 'contrapositive' scheme mentioned above holds, namely, for arbitrary models M , M ′ , and elements a ∈ U , and a ′ ∈ U ′ we have:
The following lemma gives the precise version of the above statement:
Lemma 7 (Key Lemma 3). Let M 1 , M 2 be ω-saturated Θ-models, let t ∈ U 1 , and
. Let x be a variable in correspondence language. Then the ordered couple (A, B) such that:
Proof. It is evident that B satisfies (B-type), and arguing as in Lemma 8 of [8] , we can show that A is a basic (M 1 , t), (M 2 , t ′ ) -asimulation. So we are left to consider the last three conditions of Definition 6.
To verify condition (box-2), choose any i, j such that { i, j } = { 1, 2 }, any a ∈ U i , b ∈ U j such that a A b, that is to say, tp x (M i , a) ⊆ tp x (M j , b) and choose any d, f ∈ U j for which we have b R j d and d R ✷j f .
Consider tp x (M j , f ). If { ST 22 (J 1 , x) . . . ST 22 (J q , x) } is a finite subset of this type, then we have
Since by contraposition of a A b we have that tp
, we obtain that
This means that every finite subset of the type
. Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is consistent with T h([M i , a]) and, by ω-saturation of both M 1 and M 2 , it must be satisfied in [M i , a] by some c, e ∈ U i . So for any such c and e we will have a R i c, c R ✷i e and, moreover, ∀ψ ∈ tp x (M j , f )(e |= i ψ(x)).
Thus we have that tp x (M j , f ) ⊆ tp x (M i , e), and further, by contraposition, that tp x (M i , e) ⊆ tp x (M j , f ). Thus we get that e A f and condition (box-2) is verified. To verify condition (diam-2(1)), choose any i, j such that { i, j } = { 1, 2 }, any a ∈ U i , b ∈ U j such that a A b, that is to say, tp x (M i , a) ⊆ tp x (M j , b) and choose any d ∈ U j for which we have b R j d.
Consider
} is a finite subset of this type, then we have
Since by contraposition of a A b we have that tp a) , we obtain that
. Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is consistent with T h([M i , a]) and, by ω-saturation of both M 1 and M 2 , it must be satisfied in [M i , a] by some c ∈ U i . So for any such c we will have a R i c and, moreover,
Thus we have that imp a) and choose any c ∈ U i for which we have a R ✸i c.
Therefore, the set { ST 22 (I 1 , x) . . . ST 22 (I p , x) } is disjoint from imp x (M i , a), and thus it is also disjoint from imp x (M j , b). Therefore, the formula ST (✸(I 1 ∧ . . . ∧ I p ), x) is also verified by some R ✸j -successor of b. More formally, this means that every finite subset of the type
. Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is consistent with T h([M j , b]) and, by ω-saturation of both M 1 and M 2 , it must be satisfied in [M j , b] by some d ∈ U j . So for any such d we will have b R ✸j d and, moreover,
Thus we have that tp x (M i , c) ⊆ tp x (M j , c), and therefore, that c A d. The condition (diam-2 (2)) is verified.
We are prepared now to prove the hard part of (2, 2)-instantiation of Theorem 2:
Lemma 8. Let ϕ(x) be invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal asimulations. Then ϕ(x) is equivalent to (2, 2)-standard translation of a modal intuitionistic formula.
Proof. We may assume that ϕ(x) is satisfiable, for ⊥ is clearly invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal asimulations and ⊥ ↔ ST 22 (⊥, x) is a valid formula. Throughout this proof, will write ic(ϕ(x)) for the following set:
Our strategy will be to show that ic(ϕ(x)) |= ϕ(x). Once this is done, we will apply compactness of first-order logic and conclude that ϕ(x) is equivalent to a finite conjunction of standard (2, 2)-modal x-translations of intuitionistic formulas and hence to a standard x-translation of the corresponding intuitionistic conjunction.
To show this, take any Σ ϕ -model M 1 and a ∈ U 1 such that a |= 1 ic(ϕ(x)). Then, of course, we also have ic(ϕ(x)) ⊆ tp x (M 1 , a) . Such a model exists, because ϕ(x) is satisfiable and ic(ϕ(x)) will be satisfied in any model satisfying ϕ(x). Then we can also choose a Σ ϕ -model M 2 and b ∈ U 2 such that b |= 2 ϕ(x) and tp x (M 2 , b) ⊆ tp x (M 1 , a) .
For suppose otherwise. Then for any Σ ϕ -model M such that U ⊆ N and any c ∈ U such that M, c |= ϕ(x) we can choose a modal intuitionistic formula I (M,c) such that a) . Then consider the set ¬ST 22 (I 1 , x) . . . , ¬ST 22 (I q , x) } be a finite subset of this set. If this set is unsatisfiable, then we must have ϕ(x) |= ST 22 (I 1 , x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST 22 (I q , x), but then we will also have (ST 22 (I 1 , x) a) , and hence (ST 22 (I 1 , x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST 22 (I q , x)) will be true at (M 1 , a) . But then at least one of ST 22 (I 1 , x) . . . ST 22 (I q , x) must also be true at (M 1 , a) , which contradicts the choice of these formulas. Therefore, every finite subset of S is satisfiable, and, by compactness, S itself is satisfiable as well. But then, by the Löwenheim-Skolem property, we can take a Σ ϕ -model M ′ such that U ′ ⊆ N and g ∈ U ′ such that S is true at (M ′ , g) and this will be a model for which we will have both M ′ , g |= ST 22 (I (M ′ ,g) , x) by choice of
) by satisfaction of S, a contradiction. Therefore, we will assume in the following that some Σ ϕ -model M 2 and some b ∈ U 2 are such that a |= 1 ic(ϕ(x)), b |= 2 ϕ(x), and tp x (M 2 , b) ⊆ tp x (M 1 , a) . According to Lemma 6, there exist ω-saturated elementary extensions M ′ , M ′′ of M 1 and M 2 , respectively. We have:
Also, since M 1 , M 2 are elementarily equivalent to M ′ , M ′′ , respectively, we have
By ω-saturation of M ′ , M ′′ and Lemma 7, the ordered couple (A, B) such that:
But then by (25) and invariance of ϕ(x) we get M ′ , a |= ϕ(x), and further, by (24) we conclude that M 1 , a |= ϕ(x). Therefore, ϕ(x) in fact follows from ic(ϕ(x)).
Theorem 2 now follows from Corollary 2 and Lemma 8.
Other cases
We now briefly show how to obtain the proofs for the other three instantiations of Theorems 1 and 2. The general scheme of the proofs in these cases is very similar to the the proofs given in the previous section. The main difference is that in the other cases we need to assume different sets of conditions in the definitions of modal k-asimulations and modal asimulations simpliciter. This affects the three key lemmas of the previous section, namely, Lemmas 1, 5, and 7, in that some parts of their proofs become irrelevant and some new parts need to be supplied instead. Accordingly, when treating the other three instantiations of our main results below, we mainly concentrate on how to revise the proofs of these three lemmas.
Case
In order to obtain the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 one needs to revise the proofs given in Section in the following way:
Ad Key Lemma 1: Revise the inductive step in case where I = ✷J as follows:
In this case we have
Now, consider arbitrary d ∈ U j such that b R ✷j d. Since (28) and (29) clearly imply that m < l, it follows from (27) and (p-box-1) that one can choose a c ∈ U i , such that:
So, we reason as follows: (26) and (31) 
Since d was chosen to be an arbitrary R ✷j -successor of b, this means that
and we are done. Ad Key Lemma 2: Replace the verification of condition (p-box-2) with the following verification of condition (p-box-1):
Take any (ā m , a) A (b m , b) such that m < k and any d ∈ U j such that b R ✷j d. In this case we will also have m + 1 ≤ k. Then consider tp k−m (ϕ(x), M j , d). This set is non-empty, since by our assumption we have k − m ≥ 0. Therefore, as we have r(ST 12 (⊥, x)) = 0, we will also have ST 12 (⊥, x) ∈ tp k−m+1 (ϕ(x), M j , d). Then, according to Lemma 2, there exists a finite non-empty set of logical equivalents for tp k−m+1 (ϕ(x), M j , d). Choosing this finite set, we in fact choose some finite
In fact, d falsifies this boxed disjunction for (M j , b). But, given that
and therefore this boxed disjunction must be false at (M i , a) as well. But then take any c ∈ U i such that a R ✷i c and c falsifies the disjunction under consideration. By choice of { ST 12 (J 1 , x) . . . ST 12 (J q , x) } it follows that
and thus Choose any i, j such that { i, j } = { 1, 2 }, any a ∈ U i , b ∈ U j such that a A b, that is to say, tp x (M i , a) ⊆ tp x (M j , b) and choose any d ∈ U j for which we have b R ✷j d.
. Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is consistent with T h ([M i , a] ) and, by ω-saturation of both M 1 and M 2 , it must be satisfied in [M i , a] by some c ∈ U i . So for any such c we will have a R ✷i c and, moreover,
Thus we have that tp
, and further, by contraposition, that
). Thus we get that c A d and condition (box-2) is verified.
The changes in three key lemmas in this case will look as follows: Ad Key Lemma 1: Revise the inductive step for the case I = ✸J as follows:
Now, by (36) choose a c ∈ U i such that
Since (38) and (39) clearly imply that m < l, it follows from (37) and (p-diam-1) that one can choose a d ∈ U j , such that:
So, we get that: (38) and (40)
Finally, from (43) and (46) infer that:
and we are done. Ad Key Lemma 2: Replace the verification of conditions (p-diam-2(1)) and (p-diam-2(2)) with the following verification of condition (p-diam-1):
Take any (ā m , a) A (b m , b) such that m < k and any c ∈ U i such that a R ✸i c. In this case we will also have m + 1 ≤ k. Then consider tp k−m+1 (ϕ(x), M i , c). This set is non-empty, since by our assumption we have k − m + 1 ≥ 1. Therefore, as we have r(ST 21 (⊥ → ⊥, x)) = 1, we will also have
Then, according to Lemma 2, there exists a finite non-empty set of logical equivalents for tp k−m+1 (ϕ(x), M i , c). Choosing this finite set, we in fact choose some finite
In fact, c veriifies this modalized conjunction for (M i , a). But, given that
the standard translation of modalized conjunction under consideration must be in
and therefore this modalized conjunction must be true at (M j , b) as well. But then take any d ∈ U j such that b R ✸j d and d verifies the conjunction under consideration. By choice of { ST 21 (I 1 , x) . . . ST 21 (I p , x) } it follows that Choose any i, j such that { i, j } = { 1, 2 }, any a ∈ U i , b ∈ U j such that a A b, that is to say, tp x (M i , a) ⊆ tp x (M j , b) and choose any c ∈ U i for which we have a R ✸i c. (I 1 , x) . . . ST 21 (I p , x) } is a finite subset of this type, then we have
). Thus we get that c A d and condition
Another important revision of the proofs given in Section for the case i = 2, j = 1 is omission of every reference to relation B, since asimulations are now being defined as single relations rather than ordered couples of relations.
Finally, in order to accommodate the proofs in Section to the case i = j = 1 one just needs to combine the revisions given in the present sections in a straightforward way.
5 Characterization modulo first-order definable classes of models Theorem 2 establishes a criterion for the equivalence of first-order formula to a standard translation of intuitionistic formula on arbitrary first-order models. But one may have a special interest in a proper subclass κ of the class of first-order models viewing the models which are not in this subclass as irrelevant, non-intended etc. In this case one may be interested in the criterion for equivalence of a given first-order formula to a standard translation of an intuitionistic predicate formula over this particular subclass. It turns out that if some parts of this subclass are first-order axiomatizable then only a slight modification of our general criterion is necessary to solve this problem.
To tighten up on terminology, we introduce the following definitions:
Definition 13. Let κ be a class of models. Then:
2. κ(Θ) is first-order axiomatizable iff there is a set Ax of Θ-sentences, such that a Θ-model M is in κ iff M |= Ax;
3. A set Γ of Θ-formulas is κ-satisfiable iff Γ is satisfied in some model of κ;
5. Θ-formulas ϕ and ψ are κ-equivalent iff ϕ |= κ ψ and ψ |= κ ϕ.
It is clear that for any class κ, such that Ax first-order axiomatizes κ(Θ), any set Γ of Θ-formulas and any Θ-formula ϕ, Γ is κ-satisfiable iff Γ ∪ Ax is satisfiable, and Γ |= κ ϕ iff Γ ∪ Ax |= ϕ. We say, further, that a formula ϕ(x) is κ-invariant with respect to (i, j)-modal asimulations (where i, j ∈ {1, 2}) iff it is invariant with respect to the class of (i, j)-modal asimulations connecting models in κ.
Now for the criterion of κ-equivalence to an (i, j)-standard translation of modal intuitionistic formula: Theorem 3. Let κ be a class of first-order models such that κ(Θ) is first-order axiomatizable for all finite Θ, and let ϕ(x) be κ-invariant with respect to (i, j)-modal asimulations. Then ϕ(x) is κ-equivalent to an (i, j)-standard translation of a modal intuitionistic formula.
Proof. Let Ax be the set of first-order sentences that axiomatizes κ(Σ ϕ ). We may assume that ϕ(x) is κ(Σ ϕ )-satisfiable, otherwise ϕ(x) is κ-equivalent to ST ij (⊥, x) and we are done. In what follows we will write ic κ (ϕ(x)) for the set
Our strategy will be to show that ic κ (ϕ(x)) |= κ ϕ(x). Once this is done we will conclude that Ax ∪ ic κ (ϕ(x)) |= ϕ(x).
Then we apply compactness of first-order logic and obtain that ϕ(x) is equivalent to a finite conjunction Ψ(x) of formulas from this set. But it follows then that ϕ(x) is κ-equivalent to the conjunction of the set ic κ (ϕ(x)) ∩ Ψ(x). In fact, by our choice of ic κ (ϕ(x)) we have
And by Ψ(x) ⊆ Ax ∪ ic κ (ϕ(x)) we have
and hence
To show that ic κ (ϕ(x)) |= κ ϕ(x), take any Σ ϕ -model M 1 and a ∈ U 1 such that M 1 ∈ κ and a |= 1 ic κ (ϕ(x)). Then, of course, we will also have ic κ (ϕ(x)) ⊆ tp x (M 1 , a). Such a model exists, because ϕ(x) is κ(Σ ϕ )-satisfiable and ic κ (ϕ(x)) will be κ-satisfied in any Σ ϕ -model satisfying ϕ(x). Then we can also choose a Σ ϕ -model M 2 and b ∈ U 2 such that M 2 ∈ κ, b |= 2 ϕ(x), and tp x (M 2 , b) ⊆ tp x (M 1 , a) .
For suppose otherwise. Then for any Σ ϕ -model M ∈ κ such that U ⊆ N and any c ∈ U such that M, c |= ϕ(x) we can choose a modal intuitionistic formula I (M,c) such that ST ij (I (M,c) , x) is in tp x (M, c) but not at tp x (M 1 , a) . Then consider the set (I 1 , x) . . . , ¬ST ij (I q , x) } be a finite subset of this set. If this set is κ-unsatisfiable, then we must have
but then we will also have
and hence (ST ij (I 1 , x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST ij (I q , x)) will be true at (M 1 , a) . But then at least one of ST ij (I 1 , x) . . . , ST ij (I q , x) must also be true at (M 1 , a) , which contradicts the choice of these formulas. Therefore, every finite subset of S is κ-satisfiable. But then every finite subset of the set S ∪ Ax is satisfiable as well. By compactness of first-order logic S ∪ Ax is satisfiable, and, by Löwenheim-Skolem property of first-order logic, there is a Σ ϕ -model M ′ and g ∈ U ′ such that U ′ ⊆ N and (M ′ , g) satisfies S ∪ Ax. But then we must have M ′ ∈ κ, since M ′ is a Σ ϕ -model satisfying the set of axioms for κ(Σ ϕ ). For this model and for this element in it we will have both
) by the satisfaction of S, a contradiction.
Therefore, for any given Σ ϕ -model M 1 such that M 1 ∈ κ and for any a ∈ U 1 satisfying ic κ (ϕ(x)) we can choose a Σ ϕ -model M 2 and b ∈ U 2 such that M 2 ∈ κ, b |= 2 ϕ(x), and tp x (M 2 , b) ⊆ tp x (M 1 , a) . Then, reasoning exactly as in the proof of Theorem 8, we conclude that a |= 1 ϕ(x). Therefore, ϕ(x) in fact κ-follows from ic κ (ϕ(x)). Theorem 4. Let κ be a class of first-order models such that for all finite Θ class κ(Θ) is first-order axiomatizable. Then a formula ϕ(x) is κ-invariant with respect to (i, j)-modal asimulations iff it is κ-equivalent to an (i, j)-standard translation of a modal intuitionistic formula.
Proof. From left to right our theorem follows from Theorem 3. In the other direction, assume that ϕ(x) is κ-equivalent to ST ij (I, x) and assume that for some Θ such that Σ ϕ ⊆ Θ, some Θ-models M 1 , M 2 , and some a ∈ U 1 and b ∈ U 2 such that
is κ-equivalent to ϕ(x) and M 1 is in κ, we also have a |= 1 ST ij (I, x). By Theore 2 it follows that b |= 2 ST ij (I, x), but since ST (I, x) is κ-equivalent to ϕ(x) and M 2 is in κ, we also have b |= 2 ϕ(x). Therefore, ϕ(x) is κ-invariant with respect to asimulations. Theorems 3 and 4 imply that (i, j)-modal asimulations as criteria for equivalence to a standard translation of a modal intuitionistic formula are easily scalable down to any first-order definable class of models. As all the conditions on intended models for intuitionistic modal logic, that were presented in the existing literature, seem to be easily first-order definable, this means that the criterion for equivalence of a formula in correspondence language to an (i, j)-standard translation of modal intuitionistic formula over the class of intended models will be just invariance with respect to (i, j)-modal asimulations between the intended models.
Conclusion
In this paper we have defined and vindicated 4 different versions of modal asimulations, capturing the 4 different fragments of classical first-order logic induced by the corresponding systems of satisfaction clauses for modal intuitionistic logic. In doing so, we were concentrating on different variants of Kripke semantics for intuitionistic modalities, present in the existing literature.
However, it is easy to see, that our approach is but an instance of a quite general algorithm that can be easily generalized to deal with a much wider class of extensions of intuitionistic propositional logic. It is not clear at the moment, how far such a generalization is able to reach; we only mention here one conjecture to give reader a flavor of what can be expected in the way of future work along the research lines presented above.
It is easy to see that all the intuitionistic modalities considered above are instances of a general scheme: the effect of the modality on its only argument is always a superposition of 'guarded' quantifiers, that is to say, quantifiers, restricted by a binary relation which is a part of Kripke model for this modality. To be more precise, let us call a generalized intuitionistic modality any modality µI whose induced standard translation looks as follows:
where n ≥ 1, and for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n we assume Q i ∈ {∀, ∃}. Further, ⊙ i =→ if Q i = ∀ and ⊙ i = ∧ if Q i = ∃.
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Then our conjecture is that to capture the extension of intuitionistic propositional logic by modality µ, one generally needs to define asimulation as a tuple (A 1 , . . . , A kµ ) of binary relations, where k µ ≤ n is the number of quantifier alternations in ST (µI, x). The set of conditions on basic asimulation will then have to be enlarged by k µ new conditions r 1 , . . . , r kµ , each having one of the two following forms: either for all a 1 , . . . , a m ∈ U i and all b 1 , . . . , b m ∈ U j . Here, i, j have the same meaning as in Definition 2 and {S 1 , . . . , S m } ⊆ {R 1 , . . . , R n }. Moreover, we will ensure that in the last condition r kµ we will have A p = A 1 and that the form of r kµ will be the former of the above forms if Q n is ∀ and the latter if Q n is ∃.
More precisely, we define r 1 , . . . , r kµ by induction on n as follows. If n = 1 and Q 1 = ∀, we set: r 1 := (a 1 A 1 b 1 ∧ ι j (R 1 )(b 1 , b 2 )) ⇒ ∃a 2 ∈ U i (ι i (R 1 )(a 1 , a 2 ) ∧ a 2 A j b 2 )), 6 The relations R 1 , . . . , Rn need not be all different.
and if Q 1 = ∃, we set r 1 := (a 1 A 1 b 1 ∧ ι i (R 1 )(a 1 , a 2 )) ⇒ ∃b 2 ∈ U j (ι j (R 1 )(b 1 , b 2 ) ∧ a 2 A j b 2 )).
Incidentally, the fact that these singleton sets of conditions are adequate already follows from the above proofs concerning (✷ 1 ) and (✸ 1 ). Assume, further, that n = s + 1 for s ≥ 1.
As induction hypothesis, we suppose that the set of conditions r 1 , . . . , r k µ − for µ − , where ST (µ − I, x) = Q n−1 (. . . Q 1 y 1 (R 1 (y 1 , x) ⊙ 1 ST (I, x) ) . . .))
is already defined. To define r 1 , . . . , r kµ , we need to distinguish the following cases: Case 1. Q n = Q n−1 . Then k µ = k µ − and we do not need to introduce new conditions. Instead, we transform condition r k µ − in the following way: Case 1.1 If Q n = Q n−1 = ∀, then by induction hypothesis condition r k µ − has the form:
(ι i (S s )(a s , a s+1 )) ∧ a m A q b m ).
We then replace r k µ − by the following rule r kµ , where we assume a ′ ∈ U i , b ′ ∈ U j :
(ι i (S s )(a s , a s+1 )) ∧ a m A q b m ). We then replace r k µ − by the following rule r kµ , where we assume a ′ ∈ U i , b ′ ∈ U j :
(ι j (S s )(a s , a s+1 )) ∧ a m A q b m ).
Case 2. Q n = Q n−1 . Then k µ = k µ − + 1 and we need to increase the number of conditions by one. We do this as follows:
Case 2.1 If Q n = ∀, Q n−1 = ∃, then by induction hypothesis condition r k µ − has the form: and we add the following new condition r kµ : and we add the following new condition r kµ :
It is straightforward to verify that our systems of rules for both (✷ 2 ) and (✸ 2 ) were generated according to the Cases 1.1 and 2.1 of this inductive definition, respectively. Note, however, that this general scheme is not always the most effective one. For example, consider an extension of intuitionistic propositional logic, where both (✸ 2 ) and (✸ 1 ) are available. This would allow to considerably simplify the corresponding notion of asimulation, indeed, one could get rid in this case of the second binary relation B and define asimulations as appropriate type of single binary relation A.
The other thing worth noting is that the above mentioned scheme for defining asimulations which capture expressive powers of generalized intuitionistic modalities is neither the only nor the most abstract among the generalizations that naturally come to mind in this respect.
Therefore, in our future work, we hope both to provide substantiation for the abovedefined scheme concerning the generalized intuitionistic modalities and further pursue the manifold research opportunities opening along this research line.
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